OPEN ACCESS

Legitimacy in Flux: A Theoretical Inquiry into Bangladesh’s August 2024 Interim Regime

Authors
Joyshree Das Joya
Advocate
Supreme Court of Bangladesh
Research Associate
Dr. Kazi Abdul Mannan & Associates
Dhaka, Bangladesh
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5254-4177

Dr Kazi Abdul Mannan
Professor
Department of Business Administration
Faculty of Business
Shanto-Mariam University of Creative Technology
Dhaka, Bangladesh
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7123-132X

J. state gov. mass media 2025, 3(4); https://doi.org/10.64907/xkmf.v03i04.jsgmm1

Submission received: 2 September 2025 / Revised: 8 October 2025 / Accepted: 1 November 2025 / Published: 7 November 2025

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Abstract

On 8 August 2024, an interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn into office in Dhaka following the resignation and exile of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after mass student-led protests. The formation of this interim administration raised acute legal questions because the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh does not contain a straightforward mechanism to install an extra-constitutional interim executive outside the now-abolished caretaker regime. This article undertakes a doctrinal and theoretical examination of the legal framework invoked to legitimise the interim government, situating the events of 8 August 2024 within constitutional doctrine (especially the doctrine of necessity), comparative constitutional precedents, and theories of conspiracy and political legitimacy. The paper combines doctrinal legal analysis with qualitative methods—elite interviews, content and discourse analysis of judicial opinions and official proclamations, and media triangulation—to interrogate how legality, popular will, and extra-constitutional remedies interact in times of constitutional vacuum. This paper shows that the interim government’s legality was defended through hybrid reasoning: recourse to the doctrine of necessity, invocation of emergency-preserving functions of the state, and appeals to popular sovereignty. The theoretical framework also explores how conspiracy narratives—both as analytical tools and as political forces—shaped public and elite perceptions of legality. The study concludes with recommendations for constitutional reform, safeguards to reduce doctrinal overreach in emergency legitimations, and a call for normative limits on the use of conspiratorial rhetoric in law and policy.

Keywords: Interim government; Bangladesh; doctrine of necessity; constitutional law; conspiracy theories; extra-constitutional authority; legitimacy; Muhammad Yunus.

1. Introduction

In early August 2024, Bangladesh witnessed a dramatic constitutional rupture. What began as a student movement against the quota system in public sector jobs expanded rapidly into widespread protest demanding political change. On 5 August, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced her resignation and departed for India amid escalating unrest; soon after, the Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) was dissolved, leaving a vacuum in both executive and legislative authority. This crisis was met by the swearing-in of an interim government on 8 August 2024, headed by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus. The interim government, lacking explicit constitutional origin under the then-current legal order, was tasked with stabilising the country, restoring order, overseeing transitional arrangements, and organising fresh elections.

This sudden transformation raised urgent legal and normative questions. Under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (1972, as amended), there was no extant mechanism for installing a caretaker or non-partisan interim government in the absence of the now-abolished caretaker regime. The caretaker government system, introduced in the 1990s and later abolished by the Fifteenth Amendment in 2011, had served as a non-party apparatus to oversee elections under specific circumstances. Its removal left no clearly defined constitutional route to address situations when government authority collapses or is delegitimised. Thus, the establishment of the Yunus interim government invoked legal doctrines beyond explicit constitutional text—principally, perhaps, the doctrine of necessity or analogous emergency powers.

This article undertakes a theoretical and doctrinal analysis of the legal framework by which the interim government of 8 August 2024 was justified and contested. It asks: what constitutional precedents, textual provisions, and jurisprudential doctrines were deployed to legitimise the interim regime, and how did competing narratives—including conspiracy theories, claims of popular sovereignty, and emergency justificatory rhetoric—influence that legitimacy? The study is particularly interested in the tension between legality (strict adherence to constitutional text and procedure) and legitimacy (popular acceptance, necessity, perceived moral authority) in moments of constitutional rupture.

To address these questions, the paper proceeds in several stages. First, it outlines the constitutional and historical lineage of Bangladesh’s caretaker government system, its abolition, and the legal landscape leading up to August 2024. Second, it reconstructs the events of early August 2024—the student protests, resignations, dissolution of Parliament, and the formation of the interim government—to locate where constitutional law was stretched or silent. Third, it analyses how legal rationales such as the doctrine of necessity, presidential powers, and comparative precedents were marshalled. Fourth, the paper integrates a theoretical framework that draws on legitimacy theory and the role of conspiracy narratives, examining how discourse shapes both the perception and the substance of legitimacy. Finally, empirical findings drawn from legal-document analysis, media content, and interviews are used to assess how these legal and discursive strains played out, concluding with normative proposals for constitutional reform and safeguards in future crises.

The significance of this inquiry lies not just in interpreting a specific episode in Bangladeshi constitutionalism, but in contributing to a more general theory about how constitutional orders cope when their own rules do not cover an extraordinary breakdown. The Bangladesh case illustrates how legal systems may be forced into hybrid or extra-constitutional legitimations—and how these in turn shape both state action and public expectations. By examining both doctrine and narrative, I aim to shed light on the fragile architecture of legality in states facing mass unrest, the dangers of forever relying on “necessity,” and the role of discourse (including conspiratorial claims) in the construction and contestation of political order.

2. Constitutional and Historical Background

To understand the legal contours of the interim government formed on 8 August 2024, one must trace the evolution of constitutional mechanisms in Bangladesh for dealing with transitions, crises, and non-partisan electoral administrations, especially the caretaker government system—its creation, operational history, abolition, and the precise constitutional gaps left as of mid-2024.

2.1 Origins of the Caretaker Government System

The caretaker government mechanism in Bangladesh dates from the 1990s, a period marked by political turbulence and mass movements for democratic reforms. After military rule ended in the early 1990s, there was a broad political consensus that general elections should be neutral and credible. The idea of a non-party, interim administration to oversee parliamentary elections was institutionalised through the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1996, which introduced a caretaker government empowered to hold power for a defined period until elections could be conducted (Fifteenth Amendment, 2011; Dhaka Tribune, 2025). Under this framework, once Parliament was dissolved, governance was taken over by a Chief Adviser (often a retired Chief Justice) along with advisers, until a new government took office after elections. This system aimed to reduce disputes over election legitimacy, a recurrent problem in the country’s political history.

Empirically, several national elections (e.g. 1996, 2001, and 2008) were conducted under caretaker administrations, which were widely accepted, though not without criticism, as relatively impartial oversight mechanisms. The caretaker model became a norm in Bangladeshi constitutional practice—even though its legal foundation was an amendment, not part of the original 1972 text.

2.2 Abolition via the Fifteenth Amendment

In 2011, the ruling Awami League government stewarded the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which, among other changes, abolished the caretaker government system. The Amendment passed both houses of Parliament, received presidential assent, and became law with the effect that future elections were to be overseen by incumbent governments rather than non-party caretaker administrations (Daily Star, 2024; Observer Online, 2025). Proponents of abolition claimed that caretaker governments posed risks of non-accountability and uneven transition periods. Opponents, including opposition parties and civil society groups, raised concerns that the removal of the caretaker system undermined electoral credibility and opened space for political manipulation.

After the Fifteenth Amendment, opposition parties often accused sitting governments of misusing state machinery during elections. Although elections continued under the amended constitutional regime, distrust over fairness and transparency increased. There was no alternative constitutional mechanism on standby to play the role of caretaker or interim non-partisan administration in crises triggered by mass protests, government collapse, or inability to govern.

2.3 Legal Gaps and Constitutional Vulnerability

By mid-2024, Bangladesh’s constitutional text had no clear provision for what happens when a sitting Prime Minister resigns en masse, Parliament is dissolved without a functioning government or effective mechanism to install a neutral caretaker, and elections are not imminent. Constitutional provisions exist for ordinary vacancies (e.g. of the Prime Minister or other offices) and for dissolution of Parliament, but they assume that elections will proceed within constitutionally required intervals, and that the succeeding government is formed under partisan lines as prescribed by election law. No settled jurisprudence or amendment defined a “transition government” distinct from the caretaker model or described the President’s power to appoint non-partisan or expert advisers in the absence of a government.

2.4 Political History and Precedent of Extra-Constitutional Remedies

Bangladesh has a history of constitutional breakdowns, sometimes involving military intervention, emergency rule, or hybrid regimes. For example, the 1975–78 period saw martial law and suspension of constitutional normality. Likewise, political deadlock in 1990-91, following the end of General Ershad’s rule, led to transition regimes. Some of these transitions were later legitimised in legal discourse through doctrines akin to necessity, or by re-incorporating extraordinary interventions into constitutional practice. These precedents, while not formally codified, shaped political culture and expectations.

2.5 The Immediate Lead-Up to August 2024

In July 2024, protests resumed in earnest under the banner of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, first focused on reforming quota systems in government jobs. The movement rapidly escalated as violent confrontations between protesters, security forces, and pro-government actors resulted in substantial death, injury, and public disruption (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2025; Dhaka Tribune, 2024). Between 1-3 August, widespread protests called for the resignation of Sheikh Hasina’s government, and growing non-cooperation with state machinery. The government responded with strict security measures, including curfews, mass arrests, and shutdowns of institutions. On 5 August, Sheikh Hasina resigned; on 6 August, Parliament was dissolved; by 7-8 August, formation of an interim government with Dr Yunus as Chief Adviser was agreed upon in negotiations among student leaders, the President, and key security figures (Dhaka Tribune, 2024; Le Monde, 2024).

This sequence reveals how popular mobilisation exposed the constitutional lacuna: existing rules did not accommodate an impasse where a sitting government is delegitimised by popular uprising, no caretaker provision is operational, and yet governance cannot be suspended without major risk to state stability. It is this lacuna that the interim government sought implicitly to fill—through modes of extra-constitutional justification (necessity, popular will, etc.).

3. Events of 5–8 August 2024 and Immediate Legal Responses

Between 5 and 8 August 2024, Bangladesh underwent a rapid political change with dramatic implications for constitutional law and legal legitimacy. This section reconstructs those critical days and analyses how legal institutions and actors immediately responded to the emergent interim government.

3.1 Sequence of major events: 5-8 August

5 August 2024: The student protests, which had been intensifying since July over the quota system and wider grievances, reached a tipping point. Clashes between students, security forces, and pro-government elements turned violent across multiple cities. Facing escalating unrest, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced her resignation and departed the country, reportedly going into exile in India. This abrupt exit left a vacuum in executive authority. (Amnesty International, 2024; media reports)

6 August 2024: In the absence of the Prime Minister, the Parliament (12th Jatiya Sangsad) was dissolved. This dissolution created both a legislative and executive vacuum, since no government in the usual sense remained to advise the President under constitutional norms. Protests, curfews, and institutional paralysis added urgency to the crisis. (Amnesty International, 2024; local reporting)

7 August 2024: Negotiations among diverse actors—including student movement leaders, civil society, senior figures within the judiciary, and representatives of the military establishment—took place to find a path forward. The name of Dr Muhammad Yunus, Nobel laureate and long associated with development, civil society, and public trust, surfaced as a consensus candidate to head an interim administration. (Le Monde, 2024)

8 August 2024: The interim government was formally established. President Mohammed Shahabuddin sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court’s Appellate Division under Article 106 of the Constitution to resolve the question of how to manage the governmental vacuum. In response to the presidential reference, a seven-judge bench of the Appellate Division, headed by then Chief Justice Obaidul Hassan, issued an opinion that under the extraordinary circumstances, the President had the constitutional power to appoint a Chief Adviser along with other advisers to run governance temporarily in the absence of the Prime Minister and dissolved Parliament. Following this opinion, Dr Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser with an advisory council. (The Business Standard / TBS, 2025; The Daily Star, 2025)

Throughout these days, emergency measures were informally in place—security forces were mobilised, there were curfews and restrictions, and governmental decision-making was suspended or reconfigured pending the transition.

3.2 Immediate legal reactions and institutional responses

Presidential Reference under Article 106: The core legal move taken was the use of a special reference from the President under Article 106 of the Constitution, asking the Appellate Division to opine on what course of action was permissible in light of the constitutional vacuum. This reference served as a way to anchor extra-constitutional action in a constitutional framework. The Advisory Opinion was issued contemporaneously with the formation of the interim government on 8 August. (TBS News, 2025; Dhaka Tribune, 2025)

High Court Challenges: Almost immediately, legal petitions were filed challenging the validity of the formation and oath-taking of the interim government. A Supreme Court lawyer, Mohammad Mohsen Rashid, filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging that the process of the reference was flawed and that the formation of the interim government and its assumption of power lacked a constitutional basis. (TBS News; The Daily Star, 2025)

High Court’s Ruling: On 13 January 2025, the High Court (bench of Justices Fatema Najib and Sikder Mahmudur Razi) summarily rejected the writ petition. The court held that the interim government had been formed “as per the opinion of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court” following the President’s reference under Article 106 and thus did not lack legal basis. The petition was described by the court as “malicious” and “unacceptable.” Importantly, the High Court also noted that the interim government was “backed by legal instrument as well as by the will of the people.” (TBS News, 2025; The Financial Express, 2025)

Supreme Court’s Role / Advisory Opinion: The advisory opinion rendered by the Appellate Division under Article 106 became central. The bench interpreted constitutional provisions to allow the President, in a situation where there is no functioning government (no Prime Minister to advise or direct, as per Article 48(3) regarding executive advice), to act by appointing an interim or advisory council to head governance temporarily. This interpretation was not without contention, but because the President had formally requested the opinion, and because the court acted under Article 106, its advisory opinion carried significant weight. (TBS News, 2025)

Public and Civil Society Response: Legal debates were paralleled by public actors—civil society organisations, media, international observers—urging respect for human rights, urging rapid organisation of elections, calling for transparent investigation into protester deaths and abuses, and cautioning against open-ended transitional authority. For example, Amnesty International urged the interim government to initiate independent investigations, hold those responsible accountable, and not repeat past human rights violations. (Amnesty International, 2024; HRW, 2024)

3.3 Key legal issues raised

From these immediate responses, several legal issues came sharply into relief:

• Constitutional Validity of Advisory Opinions and their binding force: How far can a presidential reference under Article 106 legitimate what would otherwise be an extra-constitutional effect?
• Extent of Presidential discretion in executive power in the absence of Prime Minister / parliamentary advice: When and how does the President cease to need advice in constitutional terms?
• Temporariness and sunset clauses: Whether the interim government’s tenure and powers were bounded and constrained to prevent abuse.
• Judicial oversight and justiciability: How much courts can review actions taken under or in reliance upon this interim legal regime.
• Popular Will versus Legal Formalism: To what extent claims of mass uprising, public assent, and necessity intervene to supplement, or perhaps override, textual constitutional requirements.

4. Doctrinal Tools and Legal Rationales

This section explores and analyses the main legal doctrines and rationales invoked to justify the interim government of 8 August 2024. These include the doctrine of necessity, residual or implied powers of the President, advisory opinions under Article 106, comparative precedents, and legitimacy claims tied to popular will.

4.1 Doctrine of Necessity

The doctrine of necessity is a judicial and constitutional doctrine that validates otherwise illegal or extra-constitutional actions under extreme circumstances when they are needed to preserve essential constitutional or state functions. Its justification arises when the existing constitutional machinery cannot operate, and inaction would lead to chaos or greater harm.

In the Bangladesh case, necessity was implicitly central. The protesters’ uprising, the resignation of the executive head, dissolution of Parliament, and the absence of legitimate government created what could be described as a “constitutional vacuum.” There was no Prime Minister to advise the President, no current Parliament, and urgent demands for order, stability, and elections. Supporting actors (judicial, civil, and political) treated the formation of the interim government as necessary to preserve the state, prevent breakdown of public order, and ensure continuity of essential services. The advisory opinion under Article 106 was thus seen not merely as legal formalism but as a vehicle to legitimise necessity.

However, under doctrine-of-necessity jurisprudence, certain constraints are essential: temporariness, minimal interference with fundamental rights, proportionality, and a commitment to return to normal constitutional order (Williams, 2010; Tushnet, 2005). Critics argued that while necessity justified the interim government’s formation, whether all these constraints were fully honoured (e.g. clarity on time-limits, transparency, protections for rights) was uncertain.

4.2 Advisory Opinion and Constitutional Provisions (President’s Residual Powers)

Another key doctrinal tool was the use of Article 106 of the Constitution. Article 106 allows the President to refer questions of law or fact to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for opinion. In this instance, that provision was used as the constitutional anchor for resolving ambiguity about what the President could do when there was no Prime Minister or functioning cabinet to advise him.

Complementary to this were interpretations of Article 48(3) of the Constitution, which concerns advice given to the President. Typically, the President acts on the advice of the Prime Minister and the cabinet. But when there is no Prime Minister (due to resignation or a similarly incapacitated situation), the question of who advises, or whether advice is necessary, becomes urgent. The Appellate Division, responding to the reference, determined that under those exceptional circumstances, the President may act (via appointment of interim advisers) to maintain governance.

Thus, the combination of residual executive powers and advisory opinion served to produce a legal basis—though extraordinary—for the interim government. It is doctrinally analogous to implied powers and emergency powers in other constitutional systems.

4.3 Comparative Precedents and Analogous Case Law

To buttress the legal reasoning, proponents and commentators drew on outer and internal examples:

In Bangladesh’s own history, past episodes of constitutional breakdown—martial law periods, the 1990 transition from Ershad’s rule, or the caretaker-administered elections—were instructive. While those transitions were sometimes formalised, others were validated after the fact by courts or constitutional amendments, reinforcing that, in extreme circumstances, courts may accept extra-constitutional remedies (historical practice).

Comparative constitutional systems: Common law jurisdictions in South Asia (Pakistan, India) and elsewhere have long struggled with the doctrine of necessity and emergent regimes. For instance, in Pakistan, the courts in certain cases legitimised military takeovers or emergency rule under necessity; in India, though more constrained, constitutional practice has also allowed exceptional measures under emergency or implied powers (Williams, 2010). Scholars often invoke such precedents to argue both for limits (to avoid tyranny) and for the necessity of having fallback doctrines when constitutional silence or incapacity arises.

4.4 Legitimacy, Popular Will, and Normative Claims

Legal doctrine alone was not sufficient to ground legitimacy; normative claims about popular will, moral authority, and crisis defined the public discourse and underscored legal reasoning.

Pro-interim narratives emphasised the mass protests of July-August, portrayed them as the expression of broad national will, and contended that those protests undermined the legitimacy of the preceding government. These narratives provided moral justification for extraordinary transitional measures.

The High Court itself, in its rejection of petitions, made reference not only to legal instruments but to the will of the people: in its full order, the court observed that the interim government “is backed by legal documents as well as by the will of the people of Bangladesh” and noted that the “mass uprising of July-August 2024 … is now part of history.” (TBS News, 2025; Dhaka Tribune, 2025)

Legitimacy linked to the emergency also implies temporality and accountability: many legal and civil society actors insisted that the interim government make clear commitments to elections, reform, investigation of abuses, and protection of fundamental rights. The presence or absence of these guarantees influences whether necessity or extra-constitutional action is accepted or rejected in public and judicial opinion.

4.5 Tensions, Criticisms, and Legal Risks

While these doctrinal tools provided a rationale, there were significant risks and criticisms.

Overreach / Abuse of Necessity: Without clearly defined limits, necessity can be used to justify open-ended or expansive powers. Courts invoking necessity risk undermining constitutional separation of powers, checks and balances, and fundamental rights protections.

Lack of explicit constitutional provision for interim governments: Because the caretaker system had been abolished, there was no explicit constitutional template for an interim non-partisan government. This gap meant that rulings or advisory opinions had to engage in implication or inference, which critics argue opens up space for uncertainty, selective interpretation, and potential abuse.

Judicial Legitimacy / Perception Risk: If the judiciary is perceived as partisan or as collaborating in extra-constitutional manoeuvres, its legitimacy may suffer. Also, heavy reliance on public sentiment or mass movement can encourage political actors to view constitutional rules as pliable under pressure.

Rights and due process under transitional arrangements: Protesters had suffered violence, journalists had been harassed, and media laws from earlier regimes had been used repressively. The interim government’s ability and commitment to investigate, redress, or avoid recurrence of rights abuses is both a legal obligation and a litmus test for legitimacy. (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Amnesty International, 2024)

5. Theoretical Framework: Legitimacy, Emergency Doctrine, and Conspiratorial Politics

To analyse the legal and political dynamics of Bangladesh’s interim government of 8 August 2024, this section develops a theoretical framework with three interrelated components: (a) theories of legitimacy and democratic authority; (b) emergency constitutional doctrine; and (c) the role of conspiratorial narratives/politics. Together, they provide lenses for understanding how legal claims are constructed, contested, and accepted (or rejected) in constitutional crises.

5.1 Legitimacy and Democratic Authority

5.1.1 What is legitimacy in constitutional/political theory

“Legitimacy” refers broadly to the normative (and empirical) question: why or under what conditions do people accept the authority of a government or regime as rightful, even when coercion or force is involved. There is no single agreed definition; political and legal theory distinguishes multiple dimensions:

• Procedural legitimacy, which emphasises that government or authority must arise via acceptable procedures (e.g. election, constitutional processes).
• Substantive legitimacy, which focuses on content (e.g. just laws, protection of rights).
• Performance or consequential legitimacy, which derives legitimacy from outcomes (stability, welfare, order).
• Popular legitimacy, or consent/acceptance by the populace, is often measured via public opinion, protest, or organised civil society.
• Major philosophers (e.g. Weber) distinguish rational-legal legitimacy (rule of law, constitutional order), charismatic legitimacy (personal authority), and traditional legitimacy (habit, custom). In crises, rational-legal legitimacy may be undermined, shifting emphasis toward performance or popular legitimacy (Habermas, 1975; Sultany, 2017).

5.1.2 Legitimacy in times of crisis

When constitutional procedures are disrupted—through a collapse of government, resignation, dissolution of Parliament, or violence—traditional procedural legitimacy is compromised. Theoretical literature on emergency powers, “exception” or “state of exception” (Agamben, Schmitt) suggests that constitutional systems may allow (de jure or de facto) suspension or bypassing of regular procedures under strict conditions. These conditions often include necessity, temporality, proportionality, minimal infringement of rights, and a commitment to return to normal constitutional order.

The paradox is that legitimacy also depends on some form of adherence to law or accepted norms—even emergency justifications must be interpretable within a constitutional frame if they are to be accepted by key institutions (courts, civil society, international actors). Literature on legitimacy crisis (Habermas; Sultany) indicates that legitimacy falling too far can provoke mass resistance or loss of order.

5.1.3 Democratic legitimacy and recognition

The literature on democratic legitimacy (internal legitimacy) and external recognition (by other states or international bodies) is relevant when legitimacy is contested. Democratic legitimacy is strong when a government emerges, or is accepted, through broadly accepted democratic norms, such as impartiality of elections, respect for rights, transparency, and popular consent. Theories of recognition in international law often link legitimacy to effective control and democratic norms in transitions (see “Democratic Legitimacy of Governments: From Theory to Practice”), though those theories are more often used in cases of coups or regime change.

5.2 Emergency Doctrine / Constitutional Exception

5.2.1 Definition and scope

“Emergency doctrine” refers to constitutional or quasi-constitutional doctrines that allow departure from ordinary constitutional constraints under exceptional conditions—crisis, emergency, breakdown, war. Key underpinning concepts: necessity, proportionality, temporality, legality (i.e. even emergency powers must have legal or constitutional authorisation or be justified by the need to preserve the constitutional order).

5.2.2 Theoretical sources

Carl Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception, where the sovereign must decide when the law must be suspended.

Legal positivism and its critics: positivists accept that law may forfeit some constraints in emergencies if authorised; critics (natural law, constitutional morality) hold that some constitutional constraints are non-derogable even in emergencies.

Comparative jurisprudence (e.g., South Asia, Latin America), where courts have sometimes upheld emergency-based interventions, but often with later rollback or invalidation if overreach occurred.

5.2.3 Legitimacy constraints on emergency powers

Even in emergencies, theory suggests legal constraints:

• Necessity: the emergency must be real, imminent, and not manufactured.
• Proportionality: responses must not go beyond what is necessary.
• Temporal limitation: fixed time limits or the requirement of periodic review.
• Reviewability and judicial oversight: courts must retain some authority and ability to check abuses.
• Rights protection: certain fundamental rights should be protected (non-derogable rights in some systems).

Those constraints are essential for maintaining legal and normative legitimacy, preventing the slide into authoritarianism.

5.3 Conspiratorial Politics and Narratives

5.3.1 What is a conspiracy narrative?

In political discourse, conspiracy narratives are stories or claims that certain actors (state, foreign powers, elites) secretly coordinate to subvert transparency, accountability or legitimate democratic processes. These may be benign (well evidenced, rational suspicion) or pathological (unfalsifiable, exaggerated, serving polarising ends).

5.3.2 Functions of conspiratorial narratives

• Delegitimisation: To undermine an opponent’s authority by portraying them as controlled by hidden, malevolent forces.
• Mobilisation: Rallying public support by framing crises as exposing deep corruption or hidden agendas.
• Moral simplification: Reducing the complexity of institutional failure, security threats, or crisis into clear villains vs victims.
• Justificatory tool: Used by both proponents (who accuse the old regime of conspiracies) and opponents (who claim the interim government is itself a front for conspiratorial powers, e.g. military, foreign) to justify exceptional measures or critique them.

5.3.3 Risks and legal consequences

• Courts may face pressure to accept claims without rigorous evidence, undermining due process.
• Conspiracy narratives can disrupt deliberative legitimacy, making compromise harder.

They may justify sweeping actions (e.g. surveillance, party bans, emergency powers) based on alleged conspiracies, which may then be misused.

5.4 Integrated Model: Legitimacy, Doctrine, and Conspiracy

Putting the above together, the theoretical framework used in this study posits that:

In a constitutional crisis, legal actors (judges, executives) attempt to re-establish legitimacy through emergency doctrines, borrowing from constitutional text where possible, and from precedent and necessity when not.

The success of such legitimations depends not only on legal validity (text, judicial opinions) but also on narrative legitimacy—how the public perceives them, how civil society frames the transition, and whether moral claims (popular will, necessity, crisis) align with legal claims.

Conspiratorial narratives function in this ecology by influencing popular will and narrative legitimacy: both enabling emergency claims (by painting lack of procedural rule as part of conspiratorial wrongdoing), and constraining or contesting them (by alleging hidden agendas behind interim authorities).

Courts and legal institutions are important in mediating between legality and legitimacy. Their behaviour—e.g. how strictly they enforce constraints of emergency (temporality, evidentiary requirement, oversight)—influences trust; departures may yield short-term stability but long-term erosion of the constitutional order.

5.5 Implications of the Framework for the Bangladesh Case

Applied to Bangladesh, this framework suggests that:

• The interim government’s claim to legitimacy must be assessed not only by its legal basis (doctrine of necessity, constitutional references, advisory opinions) but also by how well it meets legitimacy constraints: how temporary it is, how transparent, how accountable, whether rights are respected, etc.
• Popular protests and civil society mobilisation are part of the legitimacy base; they supply narrative legitimacy.
• Conspiracy narratives will likely feature strongly: those accusing the former regime of wrongdoing and hiding behind power, but also those challenging the interim government as a façade for military or foreign interference.

Legal actors (courts, lawyers) thus operate in a dual realm—interpreting constitutional text and also engaging with narrative legitimacy.

7. Findings

This section presents key empirical findings from the case study of Bangladesh’s interim government (August 2024 onward), drawn from legal decisions, media discourse, reports from international and domestic human rights organisations, and interview material. The findings are structured under the clusters: (a) legal validation and legitimacy in judicial decisions; (b) promises and implementation of reforms; (c) human rights and civil liberties; (d) political opposition, party suppression, and narratives; (e) public perception and acceptance.

7.1 Legal Validation and Judicial Legitimacy

One of the strongest findings is that the judiciary—especially the High Court—has repeatedly upheld the legality of the interim government’s formation. In particular:

On 13 January 2025, the High Court (bench of Justices Fatema Najib and Sikder Mahmudur Razi) rejected a writ petition filed by Supreme Court lawyer Mohammad Mohsen Rashid, which challenged both the president’s reference under Article 106 of the Constitution and the oath-taking of the interim government. The Court declared those actions valid and noted that

“The people of Bangladesh have accepted the interim government, leaving no room for further debate over the matter.”

Earlier, on 12 February 2025, the High Court’s full verdict explicitly observed that the interim government is “supported by the legal documents and formed with the will of the people.” This verdict affirmed that the formal process—presidential reference, Appellate Division’s opinion, and oath-taking—was consistent with constitutional procedures, even amid criticism.

Thus, judicial validation has anchored the interim government’s legality both in formal constitutional law (the President’s reference, Article 106, Supreme Court opinion) and in claims of public acceptance.

7.2 Reform Promises vs. Implementation

Another set of findings concerns the reform agenda and the gap between promise and delivery.

The interim government established multiple reform commissions—Electoral Reform, Police Reform, Judicial Reform, Anti-Corruption, Public Administration Reform, among others.

As of early August 2025, of 121 short-term actionable recommendations (drawn from these commissions), only 16 had been fully implemented; about 85 were “under implementation” according to government statements.

Reforms already implemented include some judiciary-oriented changes (e.g. a Judge Appointment Commission for the Supreme Court, setting up mediation services, information desks in courts, separate spaces for women and children in courts) and removal of legal obstacles for lawyer appointments.

Thus, there is evidence of movement toward institutional reform, but the pace and completeness are partial and uneven, with many reforms still in process or stalled.

7.3 Human Rights and Civil Liberties

A third cluster is threats to human rights and civil liberties under the interim government.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) have both documented ongoing abuses even after the regime change. These include arbitrary detentions of political opponents, abuses against the media, revenge abuses targeting former regime supporters, discrimination and violence against religious and indigenous minorities.

Reports also point to large numbers of individuals charged under vague or politically motivated cases; HRW estimated that over 92,000 people had been charged between August and September 2024 in such contexts.

A dossier by ALBD (Awami League background organisation / connected civil society) details “fake cases,” press crackdown, extrajudicial violence, sexual violence as intimidation, etc., indicating that repression, though less systematic than under the previous regime according to some reports, is nevertheless present.

7.4 Political Opposition, Party Suppression, and Bans

A major decision with deep political and legal implications has been the banning of Awami League (the former ruling party) activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The ban covers both online and offline activity, allegedly pending special tribunal proceedings for deaths during the July-August 2024 protests.

The interim government has affirmed that the ban is not meant to suppress political commentary or lawful criticism, but legal and media analysts remain concerned about chilling effects on free speech and potential misuse of counterterrorism laws.

7.5 Public Perception and Acceptance

Courts, in rulings, have cited popular acceptance as evidentiary and normative support. The High Court noted that “the people have accepted the interim government,” suggesting that public attitudes are being used implicitly as part of legitimacy claims.

Media reports, human rights group interviews, and civil society commentary show a mixture: many citizens welcomed Hasina’s resignation and saw Yunus’s appointment as a relief or chance for change; yet others remain wary of whether reforms are sincere or whether interim powers will be misused. Quantitative polling data is scarce in public sources.

8. Discussion: Legal, Normative, and Political Implications

This section interprets the findings in light of the theoretical framework, drawing out the legal, normative, and political implications of the interim government’s trajectory. It examines where legality appears fragile, where legitimacy may be undermined, and what institutional or structural reforms are required to secure rights and democratic order.

8.1 Legality vs. Legitimacy: Where the Balance Rests

The findings show that legal legitimacy has, to a substantial degree, been secured via judicial validation. The process of the President’s reference under Article 106, the Appellate Division’s opinion, and the High Court’s subsequent rulings have collectively given a constitutional anchor to what otherwise would have been a relatively large extra-constitutional step. Judicial pronouncements have relied both on formal legal mechanisms and on public acceptance as part of legitimacy.

Yet the normative analysis reveals tensions: legal validity does not always map cleanly to democratic legitimacy. Key areas of disjunction include:

Bounded temporariness: While the judiciary and executive have agreed in public that the interim government is temporary, there is no firmly established sunset clause or fully fixed timeline by which full governance must return to customary constitutional order (i.e. elections, reinstated parliamentary government). The urgency of reform remains partially unfulfilled, and many reforms are still in progress—but delays risk undermining trust.

Rights and due process: The prevalence of arbitrary detention, political prosecutions, and restrictions on opposition activity—including banning a political party—raises concerns about whether emergency or necessity is being elicited to justify suppression of rights. The tension is particularly acute when counterterrorism laws are used against political speech or party activities.

Judicial oversight in practice: While courts have ruled in favour of legality, they sometimes rely heavily on doctrinal rationales and acceptance claims rather than robust evidence, particularly regarding human rights claims, claims of misgovernance, or suppression. The question remains whether courts can or will act as an effective check on abuses once authority is consolidated or resistance diminishes.

Therefore, legitimacy in the Bangladesh case has been a hybrid: formal legality validated, but normative legitimacy more precarious—dependent on reform delivery, rights protection, and perceptive public and civil society oversight.

8.2 Normative Implications: What Should Valid Legitimacy Require?

Drawing on theory and findings, several normative implications emerge:

Sunset or fixed transition timetable: To maintain normative legitimacy, the interim government must commit to and abide by a fixed, publicly credible timeline for elections. Without this, open-endedness can produce legitimacy decay. International human rights and constitutional scholarship emphasise temporality as a key necessity element (Williams, 2010; Agamben, 2005).

Safeguards for fundamental rights and judicial review: Even during a crisis, constitutional systems should protect non-derogable rights, ensure due process, avoid vague legal standards, and allow meaningful judicial redress. Use of counterterrorism legislation, bans on parties, and mass arrests should be subject to strict legal and evidentiary standards, not mere political discretion.

Transparency and accountability in reform processes: The commissions for reform (judicial, anti-corruption, electoral, police) must produce visible, reportable outcomes; processes must be made transparent; involvement of civil society and observers can help build legitimacy. Implementation of only 16 out of 121 is a small start, but slow progress risks disillusionment.

Distinguishing between necessary emergency powers and creeping executive overreach: While the doctrine of necessity permits certain departures from ordinary procedure, normative governance means those departures are tightly circumscribed—by law, by court oversight, by public disclosure. Legal systems should maintain some institutional resistance to the erosion of democratic norms even in emergencies.

8.3 Political Implications: Power, Opposition, and Conspiratorial Narratives

The political landscape shows implications for how power is reconfigured, how opposition is treated, and how narratives (including conspiratorial ones) are mobilised.

Opposition suppression and party bans: The banning of Awami League activities under terrorism laws signals a powerful use of executive authority. While framed in terms of accountability and justice, such bans risk institutionalising political exclusion. This raises the possibility of long‐term polarisation and weakening of multiparty competition.

Narrative legitimacy, conspiratorial politics, and public memory: Findings show that both pro- and anti-interim narratives invoke conspiratorial frames. For example, supporters of Yunus frame Hasina’s regime as corrupt, seizing power through hidden influence; opponents view the ban and extraordinary powers as evidence of a conspiratorial takeover by unelected actors or foreign influence. How these narratives resonate influences legitimacy and political mobilisation.

Role of civil society, media, and international actors: Civil society and media organisations are critical as both sources of oversight and narrative platforms. The interim government’s actions toward media, press freedoms, and judicial independence will deeply shape public perception. International human rights organisations (HRW, OHCHR) and UN bodies play both normative and material roles (reporting, pressure, technical assistance).

Risk of entrenchment or rollback: There is a political risk: either the interim government transitions successfully to an elected regime, or it may use its extraordinary powers (bans, legal immunity, suppression) to become a de facto entrenched authority. The drafting or consideration of ordinances that immunise past actions (or prevent judicial challenge of interim government acts) suggests some in that direction.

8.4 Comparative and Theoretical Reflections

From a comparative constitutional perspective, Bangladesh’s interim government shares traits with other cases where constitutional crisis prompts judicial validation of non-partisan transitions or caretaker administrations (South Asia, Latin America). As in Pakistan’s historic necessity doctrines or India’s emergencies, the success of legitimacy claims often turns not on text alone but on perception, oversight, and the temporality of extraordinary powers.

The Bangladesh case also illustrates the fragility of legitimacy in the face of weak implementation: compared to theoretical models where necessity is accompanied by strict oversight, temporality, and strong popular engagement, Bangladesh has partial compliance but also significant gaps, particularly in rights enforcement and opposition treatment.

8.5 Recommendations

Based on the above, several recommendations can help bolster the legal, normative, and political health of Bangladesh’s transitional state and future constitutional resilience:

• Constitutional or legislative amendment codifying emergency / interim government rules: Bangladesh should consider a constitutional amendment that specifies procedures, powers, limitations, accountability, and fixed time limits for interim or non-partisan government formation in constitutional crises.
• Establish independent oversight mechanisms: Oversight bodies (judicial, parliamentary or extra-parliamentary) should be empowered to review interim government actions, especially those affecting fundamental rights, political freedoms, or suppression of dissent.
• Ensure judicial independence and access to justice: Strengthening the judiciary, ensuring it can adjudicate rights claims without political interference, and that citizens have meaningful access to legal redress for arbitrary detention or abuses.
• Transparency in reform commission outputs and implementation: Publishes periodic reports, involves public participation, and enables external auditing of commission work. High visibility of reform failures or successes will influence legitimacy.
• Restrictions on bans/counterterrorism laws being used as political tools: Safeguards in law to limit the use of counterterrorism powers or bans to contexts where there is clear evidence, due process, and judicial oversight.
• Protection for minorities, press, dissent: Explicit legal protections, law enforcement training, and independent inquiry into hate crimes, minority rights violations, and freedom of the press. Necessary to avoid a narrative of betrayal or conspiratorial oppression.

8.6 Broader Implications for Constitutional Theory

The Bangladesh case provides a rich empirical instance confirming several theoretical claims:

• Emergencies or constitutional vacuums push the constitutional order to rely on doctrines of necessity or implied powers, but such reliance always carries normative risk.
• Legitimacy is multidimensional: formal legality must be accompanied by popular acceptance and rights protection; otherwise, legitimacy is fragile.
• Conspiratorial narratives are not peripheral—they are central both to popular perception and elite justification in crisis. Legal actors cannot ignore the discursive field.

The resilience of constitutionalism depends on pre-crisis institutions (judiciary, civil society, media) being sufficiently autonomous to act during and after crises.

9. Conclusion: Conspiratorial Legitimacy and Pathways for Future Research

The constitutional and political turbulence surrounding the Interim Government of Bangladesh in August 2024 remains one of the most contested episodes in the country’s democratic history. While official narratives framed the transitional authority as a constitutional necessity in response to mass unrest and administrative paralysis, alternative interpretations — including conspiracy theories — have complicated the public understanding of its legitimacy. The intersection of legality, power, and perception in this case reveals how formal doctrines of necessity, emergency, and public order can be reinterpreted under conditions of political anxiety (Halim, 2024; Rahman & Sultana, 2025).

From a theoretical standpoint, the invocation of “doctrine of necessity” and “public safety” parallels the legitimising narratives seen in other South Asian contexts, where transitional governments often emerge under ambiguous constitutional interpretations (Choudhry, 2020). However, the 2024 case also demonstrates how conspiracy narratives — alleging foreign influence, elite manipulation, and media orchestration — become integral to the political construction of legitimacy. These conspiratorial discourses, though often dismissed as fringe, serve a sociopolitical function: they translate elite constitutional manoeuvres into popular mythologies of betrayal, resistance, and restoration (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Uscinski, 2022).

The legal ambiguity surrounding the 8 August 2024 transition thus underscores a deeper epistemological challenge — the blurred line between legal rationalisation and conspiratorial imagination. In a post-truth era, the legal justifications for extraordinary governance are increasingly mediated through digital disinformation ecosystems that amplify or delegitimise state action (Ahmed, 2024). This convergence of law, media, and myth warrants further inquiry into the sociology of legality — how legal legitimacy is produced, circulated, and consumed in populist democracies.

Future research should therefore move beyond formal constitutional analysis to explore the discursive and cognitive dimensions of legal legitimacy. Comparative studies across South Asia may uncover regional patterns in how conspiratorial thinking operates as a political resource in moments of constitutional rupture. Moreover, interdisciplinary engagement — combining political science, media studies, and legal theory — could illuminate how hybrid regimes use conspiracy as a strategic instrument of governance. Ultimately, understanding the 2024 Interim Government requires not only a study of its legality but also an investigation into the psychological and communicative infrastructures that made its legitimacy plausible.

A brief methodological transparency note

The article draws on contemporaneous reporting (Al Jazeera, Reuters, EEAS, AP), legal commentaries, and interviews conducted in autumn 2024. Where reported judicial positions are cited, they refer to published summaries and press accounts of court pronouncements; full bench opinions (where available) were analysed directly when possible. Given that events remain politically sensitive and unfolding, readers should treat the empirical account as a contemporaneous scholarly interpretation rather than a final historical adjudication.

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