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Judicial Reforms in Transition: Insights from Bangladesh’s Interim Government (August 2024–2025)

Authors

Joyshree Das Joya Advocate Supreme Court of Bangladesh Research Associate Dr. Kazi Abdul Mannan & Associates Dhaka, Bangladesh https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5254-4177

Dr Kazi Abdul Mannan Professor Department of Business Administration Faculty of Business Shanto-Mariam University of Creative Technology Dhaka, Bangladesh ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7123-132X

J. polic. recomm. 2025, 4(4); https://doi.org/10.64907/xkmf.v4i04.jopr1

Submission received: 3 September 2025 / Revised: 9 October 2025 / Accepted: 1 November 2025 / Published: 8 November 2025

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Abstract
The transition in Bangladesh following the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the installation of an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus catalysed an ambitious set of reforms targeting state institutions, with particular attention to the judiciary. This article examines the judicial reform agenda during the interim period (August 2024–August 2025), situating reform initiatives within theories of institutional change and elite bargaining. Using qualitative methods — document analysis, elite interviews reported in public sources, and thematic content analysis of policy documents and press coverage — the study traces the origins, designs, and early implementation of major reform measures: the Judicial Reform Roadmap announced by the Supreme Court leadership, legislative and prosecutorial changes linked to transitional justice claims, and administrative reforms aimed at reducing case backlogs and improving transparency. The findings show a tension between reformist intent (independence, digitalisation, access to justice) and politically charged measures (party bans, expanded prosecutorial mandates) that risk instrumentalising the legal system for transitional politics. The article argues that successful, sustainable judicial reform will require institutional safeguards — transparent appointment mechanisms, procedural protections, incremental depoliticisation, and engagement with professional and civil society actors. Policy recommendations stress procedural insulation, judicial capacity-building, and international technical support. The study contributes an empirically grounded, theory-informed account of judicial reform under political transition.

Keywords: judicial reform, Bangladesh, interim government, institutional change, judicial independence, transitional justice

1. Introduction

The judiciary is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the rule of law, yet in many transitional polities it remains subject to entrenched political influence, institutional inertia and capacity deficits. In the case of Bangladesh, the interim interval beginning in August 2024 with the installation of the Muhammad Yunus-led government has opened a window of institutional opportunity, particularly for reforming the justice sector. This article examines the judicial reform agenda during the period August 2024 to August 2025. It explores how reform notions—centred on judicial independence, administrative efficiency and accountability—have been articulated, the political context within which they travel, and the early shaping of those reforms. In doing so, we attend to both the promise of change and the persistent risks attached to reform in a politically charged transition.

The decision to focus on the judiciary in this interim period arises from two interlinked observations. First, the upheaval that led to the interim government dismantled long-standing institutional settlements in Bangladesh, providing what may be a “critical juncture” in which reform actors had the opportunity to reset rules, norms and practices (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Second, the judiciary itself has been a focal site of structural weakness in Bangladesh: politicised appointments, delays, backlog, and executive influence have all been persistent concerns (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2010; Shapiro, 1981). In the intersecting dynamics of transition and institutional reform, the judiciary offers an especially meaningful lens through which to assess the interplay of design, implementation and elite bargaining.

In this study, we ask: What kinds of judicial reform initiatives have been proposed and launched in Bangladesh under the interim government? How has the broader political transition shaped the design, sequencing and scope of these reforms? And what do early indications suggest about the likelihood of deeper institutional change rather than superficial innovation? To address these questions, we undertake a qualitative case‐study of the interim period, drawing on policy documents, public statements by reform leaders, media coverage, and analyses by civil society and international organisations. Our theoretical orientation combines historical institutionalism—which emphasises how past structures constrain and enable change—and elite-bargaining theory, which highlights how institutional outcomes reflect strategic interactions among powerful actors (Khan, 2010; Hall & Taylor, 1996).

This analysis is important for a number of reasons. Judicial reform in transition contexts is both technically demanding and politically sensitive: reforms can bolster legitimacy and performance, but they can also be manipulated for partisan ends (Teitel, 2003; Skaar, 2011). In Bangladesh’s case, the interim government faces the dual imperative of accountability for prior regime excesses and institutional renewal in preparation for democratic elections. The judiciary lies at the heart of this challenge. Its credibility affects public trust, investor confidence and the broader governance environment. By documenting the early reform agenda and unpacking its political embedding, this article contributes both to the Bangladesh case and to the broader literature on judicial reform in transitional settings.

The article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 sets out the political context and institutional opportunity that framed reforms in Bangladesh from August 2024 to August 2025. Section 3 reviews relevant literature on judicial reform and transition, Section 4 presents the theoretical framework, Section 5 outlines the research methodology, Section 6 reports the findings (organised by key reform domains), Section 7 offers discussion, Section 8 presents policy recommendations, Section 9 concludes, and Section 10 reflects on limitations and directions for future research.
By unpacking the Bangladesh experience, we aim to illustrate how judiciaries can become arenas of transition-era institutional reform—and why the success of such reform depends not just on technical fixes but on how they are embedded in political settlements and institutional trajectories.

2. Context: Political Transition and Institutional Opportunity (Aug 2024–2025)

2.1 Political background

Bangladesh entered a period of profound political upheaval in mid-2024. Widespread protests, especially among students and youth, erupted in July 2024, catalysing a mass movement that culminated in the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and the dissolution of the 12th Jatiya Sangsad. The protests were driven by grievances including allegations of state corruption, political exclusion and systematic human-rights violations under the preceding regime. In the immediate aftermath, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in on 8 August 2024 as the head (Chief Adviser) of the interim government, accompanied by a cabinet of advisers drawn from academia, civil society, retired military and student movements (Al Jazeera, 2024; Wikipedia, 2025). The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in an advisory capacity, confirmed the legality of this interim government, invoking Article 106 of the constitution to fill the vacuum created by the resignation of the prior regime (The Business Standard, 2024). Thus, the transition was both sudden and constitutionally contested, creating a fluid space for institutional re-ordering.

The interim government assumed power amid high expectations and considerable volatility. Domestic actors—including student organisations, civil society groups, and protest coalitions—viewed the new administration as a mandate for sweeping reform. International partners likewise expressed cautious optimism about restoring democratic governance and institutional integrity (Al Jazeera, 2024). As the head of the interim government affirmed shortly after taking office: “Our task is now to carry out vital reforms in our electoral system, judiciary, local government, media, economy and education.” (Business Standard, 2024). In this sense, the interim period presented what scholars call a “window of opportunity” for institutional change: a moment when conventional patterns of power might be disrupted and reform actors might introduce new institutional arrangements.

2.2 The interim government’s reform mandate

The interim government articulated a broad reform mandate aimed at redefining the state–society contract and the architecture of governance. In September 2024, Yunus announced the establishment of six sectoral commissions: on the electoral system, police administration, judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration and constitutional reform. Each commission was to be led by high-profile citizens and tasked with rapidly producing recommendations (Prothom Alo, 2024; bdnews24.com, 2024). These commissions symbolised the government’s intention to treat institutional reform not as a piecemeal exercise but as a comprehensive re-engineering of state organs. Analysts view this as an attempt to seize a critical juncture – the rupture occasioned by regime change – to embed meta-reforms across the state’s core mechanisms.

The reform narrative was explicitly framed in normative terms of equal citizenship, transparency, accountability and welfare. Yunus emphasised that the reforms were not simply procedural but transformative: “Let us not dwell on the past obstacles. Instead we must act decisively … and realise the dreams of our martyrs by building a society of equality, dignity and liberty,” he said at a national seminar on judicial independence and efficiency in June 2025 (Business Standard/The Daily Star, 2025). Within the judiciary domain, this translated into early commitments to judicial independence, separate secretariat structures, case-flow management, and removal of executive interference in transfers (The Daily Star, 2025). Thus, the interim government treated judicial reform as central to its legitimacy and to the overhaul of the governance ecosystem.

2.3 Institutional opportunity: Why the judiciary?

The judiciary in Bangladesh has historically faced significant structural and institutional constraints: political patronage in appointments, heavy case-backlogs, limited administrative autonomy, and executive dominance over court administration (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2010). These structural weaknesses inhibited the judiciary’s capacity to serve as an effective check on power or to deliver timely justice. In the transitional moment post-August 2024, two dynamics combined to open up space for reform.

First, the political rupture itself—regime change, protest mobilisation and elite realignment—created a disruption of existing institutional equilibrium. According to historical institutionalism, such moments may weaken entrenched path-dependencies and allow for change that would otherwise be blocked (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The interim government effectively signalled to judicial and other state actors that the rules of the game were changing, which created both opportunity and uncertainty.

Second, the interim government’s public commitment to reform—especially in the judiciary—provided a political impetus for change. Chief Adviser Yunus’s June 2025 remarks explicitly anchored judicial reform in the broader normative vision of the transition: “three magic words—judiciary, independence and efficiency—define the foundation of society.” (The Business Standard, 2025). Institutional actors within the judiciary—such as the Supreme Court leadership—also began to articulate reform roadmaps, referencing possibilities for a separate secretariat for the judiciary, revised transfer guidelines, and stronger oversight via a Supreme Judicial Council (The Daily Star, 2025). This alignment of reform vision and institutional interest opened a window for credible reform initiatives.

2.4 Political and institutional constraints

Despite the opportunity, reform in such a context is never unconstrained. Elite-bargaining theory reminds us that reforms reflect strategic interactions among powerful actors rather than purely normative design (Khan, 2010). In the Bangladesh case, the interim government faced multiple powerful constituencies: the outgoing regime’s networks, the security apparatus, the bureaucracy, the judiciary itself, and international donors and partners. Each has distinct incentives, potential veto power, and capacities to shape or obstruct reform. For example, while administrative modernisation may enjoy broad support, reforms affecting appointments, transfers, tenure protections or prosecutorial expansion may generate resistance.

Moreover, the very nature of a transitional period introduces risks. The urgency of accountability for the prior regime may push the interim government toward expansive prosecutorial reforms or politicised judicial interventions. This, in turn, may create a perception of victor’s justice, undermining the legitimacy of the reform process. In Bangladesh, early actions—for example, rapid judicial appointments and a heightened focus on prosecutorial and tribunal mechanisms—have drawn criticism alongside praise, meaning the institutional opportunity is tempered by significant political risk.

2.5 Summary of contextual dynamics

In sum, the period from August 2024 through August 2025 in Bangladesh constitutes an institutional window characterised by a regime break, high reform expectations and leadership commitment to overhaul state institutions, including the judiciary. The interim government harnessed the mandate for reform, established commissions, and publicly committed to judicial independence and efficiency. Yet, the same context also encompasses potent institutional constraints—path dependencies, entrenched power holders and the heavy weight of accountability demands. It is against this backdrop that the article will trace the design, sequencing and early implementation of judicial reforms. The following sections will elaborate on a theoretical framework and present the qualitative methodology before turning to empirical findings on the judicial reform domain itself.

3. Literature Review

The literature on judicial reform, judicial independence, and the rule of law is extensive and multidisciplinary; this section organises it into three major themes relevant to the present study: (i) the institutionalist and performance-oriented approaches to judicial reform, (ii) the politics of judicial independence and accountability, and (iii) judicial reform during political transitions and the interplay of accountability and institutional renewal.

3.1 Institutionalist and performance-oriented approaches to judicial reform

One influential strand of the literature treats judicial reform primarily as an administrative and institutional challenge: how to make courts more efficient, accessible, and responsive. For example, in their review “Judicial Reform”, the authors argue that simply injecting resources into courts is insufficient, and that incentives, streamlined procedures, and institutional design matter more for actual performance improvements (World Bank Research Observer, 2003).

In this view, the crucial impediments to judicial performance are not only budgetary but also procedural: excessive complexity, overlapping jurisdictions, weak case-management systems, and lack of accountability of judges. Thus, reformers emphasise measures such as case-flow management systems, simplified procedures, alternative dispute resolution, and digitalisation.

The institutionalist literature, drawing from historical institutionalism, emphasises that courts are embedded in path-dependent structures. For example, Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009), in their comparative article on regimes and the rule of law, highlight that even democracies struggle to produce independent courts when institutional fragmentation and weak enforcement mechanisms prevail.  The institutional-design literature thus underlines that reform is not simply a matter of adopting a set of “best practices” but of working with existing institutional architectures, the incentives of actors, and the historical legacies of prior regimes.

In the context of judicial reform, this means that courts reforming efficiency (digital filings, judicial training, judicial administration reform) may yield some gains—yet unless appointment, tenure, oversight, and culture are also addressed, performance gains may be short-lived. Sara, Ansari, and Jabeen’s study of the National Judicial Policy in Pakistan concluded that many reform initiatives stalled because they failed to account for indigenous institutional realities and actor incentives.

3.2 Politics of judicial independence and accountability

A second core theme studies the interplay between judicial independence and political dynamics—how courts relate to executive and legislative branches, how appointment and promotion processes can undermine independence, and how accountability mechanisms may both strengthen and risk judicial freedom. In their review of judicial independence in comparative perspective, Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009) argue that although democracies are more likely to produce independent courts and rule-of-law outcomes, democracy alone is not sufficient.

Courts in developing countries may still be weak and subject to political interference.
Similarly, Huchhanavar (2023) conceptualises judicial independence and accountability from a regulatory perspective, identifying three dimensions: institutional independence (insulation of the judiciary from external influence); internal independence (within-judiciary dynamics); and individual independence (protection of individual judges).

These conceptualisations highlight the multidimensional nature of independence. Judicial reform cannot simply treat courts as black boxes; it must deal with formal and informal structures, incentives, and actor behaviour. For instance, if judges depend on the executive for transfers or salaries or face pressure from political actors or media, then formal guarantees alone will not suffice.

Moreover, the literature emphasises accountability as a complementary dimension. The independence–accountability nexus is complex: while independence is necessary for impartiality, unchecked independence risks a lack of legitimacy or accountability. Akkas’s comparative study of Bangladesh stresses that maintaining the balance between independence and accountability is central to public confidence in the judiciary. Critics argue that reforms which increase judges’ autonomy without parallel measures for transparency and oversight may inadvertently deepen public trust deficits.

In addition, the literature on “judicial activism” in Bangladesh highlights the local political dimension: the capacity of courts to step in where legislative or executive failings exist, but also the risk that activism becomes a substitute for democratic processes. One study proposes a “golden mean” between excessive judicial intervention and passive adjudication.

3.3 Judicial reform in transitional contexts: accountability, legitimacy and reform sequencing

Finally, a rich body of literature addresses judicial reform in transitional or post-conflict contexts. These works underscore the tension between accountability (for past abuses, corruption, or regime excesses) and the need to rebuild or reform institutions for future legitimacy. Teitel (2003) describes transitional justice as a genealogy: transitions often feature hybrid institutions, extraordinary chambers, and pressure for rapid reform, which can both advance and undermine long-term legitimacy. Similarly, Skaar (2011) shows that the coexistence of truth commissions and criminal trials may produce overlap, duplication or conflicting legitimacy effects.

Scholars have emphasised the strategic dimension: transitional governments may attempt to use courts for legitimacy gains, but the same courts may be vulnerable to capture or seen as instruments of victors’ justice. For example, the study of judicial reform in China indicates that even where formal changes are introduced to strengthen independence, the political context remains dominant and reforms may be superficial.

In the broader comparative literature on judicial reform, Teitel’s and others’ insights point to crucial features: timing and sequencing of reform matters; the legitimacy of the reform process matters (inclusive, transparent, credible); and the broader political settlement (who controls power) shapes reform outcomes. The World Bank review noted that efficiency reforms alone are insufficient, and that independence remains a key but under-addressed factor across many countries.

In transitional contexts, elite bargaining and institutional politics are particularly salient: reformers operate in a compressed window when institutional rules may shift, but the same window often triggers political conflict over appointments, oversight, and the shape of the judiciary. Pakistan’s recent reform attempts illustrate how entrenched actors can resist changes in appointment and governance, even when administrative reforms proceed.

3.4 Synthesis and relevance to Bangladesh’s interim context

Synthesising the literature, three lessons emerge for the Bangladesh case: Judicial reforms must address both institutional design (administration, procedures) and governance (appointment, independence, oversight) to be effective. Independence and accountability must be treated as complementary rather than opposing goals; creating autonomous courts without oversight risks legitimacy, and the reverse prioritisation may perpetuate judicial subservience. The transitional context introduces both opportunity and risk: windows of institutional reform open, but also heightened political stakes and pressures. Reform sequencing, actor incentives, and institutional embedding matter deeply.

For Bangladesh, as the interim government sets out judicial reform initiatives, the literature suggests caution: administrative modernisation alone will not guarantee independence or legitimacy; appointment, transfer, tenure and oversight reforms will be just as critical. Moreover, the interim period’s elite bargaining dynamics mean that the structure of power—including the executive’s willingness to cede influence over courts—will strongly shape outcomes. The following theoretical framework draws on these themes and informs the empirical analysis of the Bangladesh case.

4. Theoretical Framework

This study draws on two complementary theoretical approaches—historical institutionalism and elite bargaining theory—to explain how and why judicial reforms arise in transitional contexts. The following sections explain each theory in turn and then synthesise them into a composite framework for analysing judicial reform under the interim government in Bangladesh.

4.1 Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism is rooted in the view that institutions matter—not just as static designs but as enduring structures shaping actor behaviour, policy choices and path dependency (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Under this approach, institutions create “rules of the game” that canalise politics and constrain change; reforms become difficult because prior choices set trajectories, create vested interests, and embed norms. Critical junctures—moments of large disruption such as regime change or crisis—provide windows when institutional trajectories may shift, but only if actor agency capitalises on that moment (Mahoney, 2000).

Applying this to judicial reform means that courts do not operate in a vacuum: they are embedded in legal, political and bureaucratic frameworks which shape appointment procedures, promotion, budgeting, and administrative autonomy. Institutional legacies—colonial legal structures, patronage networks, judiciary-executive bargaining—matter. Historical institutionalism predicts that reform during transitions requires not only formal rule-change but shifts in actor strategies, incentives, and organisational culture.

In the Bangladesh context, the interim period (Aug 2024–Aug 2025) represents a potential critical juncture. The prior institutional settlement featured a judiciary widely critiqued for delays, political influence, and limited autonomy (Bari, 2022). The regime shift opens a possibility for re-ordering of rules, norms and practices; but whether this leads to durable reform depends on how actors engage with institutional legacies, which structures they change, and how quickly.

4.2 Elite bargaining theory / political settlement perspective

Elite bargaining theory focuses on how political elites negotiate and bargain over institutional structures and resources, shaping reform outcomes through power dynamics and incentives rather than technocratic design (Khan, 2010). Under this view, reform is less about best practices and more about how dominant actors—including executive, legislature, courts, security forces, large business interests—agree on a settlement which distributes power, sets rules of inclusion/exclusion, and determines institutional autonomy. Institutional change is possible when an elite coalition sees benefits or is credibly constrained from obstructing change.

In the context of judicial reform, elite bargaining suggests that even if a reform plan is technically sound, its implementation depends on whether key actors accept changes to appointment procedures, oversight mechanisms, budget autonomy, or administrative control. If the executive retains effective appointment power, judicial independence may remain nominal. If security or bureaucratic actors resist administrative modernisation, fearing loss of influence, reforms may stall.

Moreover, transitional periods amplify bargaining: the interim government must negotiate legitimacy with civil society and international actors while containing opposition from prior elites. Judicial reform thus becomes part of a broader political settlement: accountability mechanisms may serve as legitimacy engines, but they also retrench power for new elites.

4.3 Composite analytical framework

By combining historical institutionalism and elite bargaining theory, this study frames judicial reform in the transitional Bangladesh case as occurring in a contested institutional window where actors engage in bargaining over rules, resources, and power, and where institutional legacies constrain reform choices. The framework emphasises:

• Critical juncture opportunity: The interim period is a potential window of opportunity to change institutional trajectories. Actor agency matters, and institutional inertia still binds.
• Reform sequencing and path dependency: Institutional change will depend on which domains are addressed first—administration, appointment procedures, oversight—and how deeply historical legacies are engaged.
• Actor incentives and bargaining: Reform initiatives must align with the interests or credible constraints of major actors (executive, judiciary, bureaucracy, civil society).
• Institutional embedding and sustainability: For reform to endure, procedural change must be codified, institutional actors must internalise new norms, and oversight/enforcement mechanisms must be credible.
• Politics of accountability and legitimacy: In transitional settings, reforms serve dual purposes of performance improvement and legitimacy generation. The interface between accountability for past abuses and institutional renewal is central.

In applying this to the Bangladesh judiciary, the framework suggests we should ask: Which domains of reform (administrative, appointment, oversight) were emphasised first by the interim government and judiciary leadership? What incentives did the executive, judiciary and other elites have to engage or resist reform? How deeply did institutional legacies (e.g., executive appointment dominance, administrative dependence) condition reform design? And — importantly — what does the elite settlement around power redistribution imply for the sustainability and independence of the judiciary?

This analytic frame guides the subsequent empirical sections of this article by pinpointing not just what reforms were proposed and implemented, but how the institutional context and elite bargaining shaped their selection, sequencing and prospects for embedding.

5. Research Methodology

5.1 Research design

This study employs a qualitative case-study design to explore the nature, dynamics and early implementation of judicial reforms in Bangladesh’s interim government period (August 2024–August 2025). A qualitative case study is appropriate because the research questions emphasise how and why reform initiatives were designed and launched in a real-life institutional transition context where boundaries between phenomenon and context are blurred (Yin, 2018; see also Bazeley, 2013). Qualitative case study research is therefore well suited to examine complex institutional processes embedded in political, social and legal settings (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995). For this reason, the study focuses on the single “case” of judicial reform under the interim government in Bangladesh, drawing on multiple sources of data to provide depth of understanding.

5.2 Case boundary and unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the judicial reform initiative undertaken in Bangladesh during the interim government period (August 2024–August 2025). While the broader institutional environment is relevant, the study narrows its focus to reforms in the judiciary, including administrative modernisation, appointment/oversight mechanisms, and accountability-linked prosecutorial expansion. The case boundary is set by the temporal period (August 2024 to August 2025) and by the institutional domain (judiciary). This bounded case allows concentrated examination of how the political transition created an institutional window, how reform actors engaged, and which reform trajectories were followed.

5.3 Data sources and collection

Data were collected via a document- and media-based qualitative protocol. Given public access constraints in the Bangladeshi context and the politically sensitive nature of the reforms, primary field interviews were not feasible; instead, the study relies on:

• Official policy documents and reform booklets released by the interim government (e.g., “Reforms by the Interim Government,” June 2025)
• Public statements, speeches and reform roadmaps issued by the Supreme Court leadership and the judiciary administrative offices
• National and international news media coverage of reform developments, reform controversies, prosecutions, legislative initiatives and public commentary
• Reports and assessments by civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations (e.g., UNDP, Transparency International) that monitor justice sector reform

This multi‐source approach allows triangulation of evidence and provides a more holistic view of the reform processes (Yin, 2018; Baxter & Jack, 2008).

5.4 Data analysis

The collected materials were subjected to thematic content analysis. Firstly, documents and media narratives were coded for major reform domains: administrative modernisation (digital courts, case management), appointment/oversight reforms, and accountability/prosecutorial tools. Secondly, actor mapping identified key actors (executive, judiciary leadership, commissions, civil society) and their incentives and influence. Thirdly, sequences of reform initiatives were charted to examine ordering, timing and framing. Thematic analysis followed grounded elements of inductive coding (identifying emergent themes) and deductive coding (mapping to the theoretical framework’s dimensions of institutional opportunity and elite bargaining). The process included iterative re-reading of documents, memoing, and comparison across sources for consistency and divergence (Bazeley, 2013).

5.5 Validity, reliability and ethical considerations

To enhance validity, the study uses data triangulation (multiple sources) and seeks convergence of evidence across documents, media and NGO reports (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2018). The analysis acknowledges positionality: the researcher stands outside Bangladesh and depends on publicly available texts, which limits access to internal deliberations and may bias public‐facing narratives. This limitation is noted and does not invalidate the findings, but places them in a context of publicly visible reform dynamics. Ethical considerations include careful citation of sources, avoidance of speculative claims about actor intentions beyond documented evidence, and sensitivity to politically charged claims. Given the publicly available nature of data, no formal ethics review was required, but the researcher maintained standard practices of transparency and attribution.

5.6 Limitations

Several methodological limitations must be acknowledged. First, because of the reliance on publicly available information, internal negotiations, informal elite bargaining and confidential deliberations are not directly accessed; hence, some understanding of actor incentives is inferential rather than empirically based. Second, the single‐case design limits generalisability; findings are specific to Bangladesh’s interim context. However, the design is appropriate for theory‐building and for deep insight into the process. Third, the temporal boundary (August 2024–August 2025) captures early reform initiatives, meaning that medium- to long-term outcomes of reform are not yet available. The study thus emphasises early signals and trajectories rather than definitive impact outcomes.

6. Findings

This section presents the findings of the qualitative analysis structured around the major reform domains identified in the research: (1) administrative modernisation and access to justice; (2) appointment, tenure, and governance reforms; (3) accountability, prosecutorial expansion, and transitional justice; and (4) political-institutional dynamics and elite bargaining. For each domain, evidence from the data sources is summarised and interpreted in light of the theoretical framework.

6.1 Administrative modernisation and access to justice

One of the early and visible reform initiatives under the interim government concerned the administrative and technical modernisation of the judiciary. The official “Reforms by the Interim Government” policy booklet (June 2025) lists “digital court infrastructure,” “case-flow management,” and “reducing backlog and delays” among its priorities. Concurrently, the judiciary’s leadership issued a reform roadmap in September 2024, emphasising digital filing, selected pilot benches for paperless proceedings, and training of court staff (Supreme Court of Bangladesh, 2024). Reports from international partners (e.g., UNDP) noted that technical assistance had been requested for court automation. These developments suggest that administrative reform was selected as an early and less overtly political domain of change—consistent with the framework’s suggestion that incremental reforms of procedures and performance are more feasible in transitional settings.

Implementation appears to have advanced modestly: media reports in early 2025 indicated workshops and pilot digital courts in selected urban jurisdictions, but also highlighted uneven geographic roll-out and resource constraints. For example, a January 2025 news story noted that some rural court offices still lacked basic internet connectivity, limiting digital filing uptake. The data thus point to a partial but meaningful opening of an institutional window: administrative modernisation was pursued, albeit within recognised capacity limits.

6.2 Appointment, tenure, and governance reforms

The second domain pertains to how judges are appointed, transferred, and governed—a domain central to judicial independence yet also politically sensitive. The roadmap issued by the Supreme Court leadership included language about “developing transparent appointment criteria,” “reducing executive interference in transfers,” and “extending professional development programmes” (Supreme Court of Bangladesh, 2024). However, the documentary evidence indicates that statutory or structural changes to appointment commissions, transfer rules or tenure protections did not pass during the period studied. Media and NGO commentary flagged that while administrative reforms proceeded, the more contentious governance-appointment domain remained largely dormant.

Civil society commentary, for instance, from Transparency International Bangladesh (2025), emphasised that the absence of legal reform in appointment processes meant that entrenched executive influence remained unaddressed. The findings thus show a clear split: while reform rhetoric included governance and appointment enhancements, actual change was minimal—suggesting that elite bargaining constrained reforms in this domain. This pattern aligns with theoretical predictions about power-intensive domains being harder to shift during transitional periods.

6.3 Accountability, prosecutorial expansion and transitional justice

A third domain of reform involved expanding prosecutorial and tribunal mandates tied to transitional justice for the protest-driven political upheaval. Data show that in mid-2025, the interim government introduced amendments to anti-terrorism legislation and the International Crimes Tribunal statutes that broadened prosecutorial reach, permitted charges against organisations, and allowed expanded investigative powers (Associated Press, 2025). Simultaneously, the government banned the political activities of the previous ruling party and initiated high-profile prosecutions of senior figures (Reuters, 2025).

These developments illustrate how the transition context combined reformist rhetoric (accountability, rule-of-law) with politically charged legal measures. NGO reports flagged that while accountability may be legitimate, the rapid deployment of prosecutorial tools without parallel oversight reforms risked perceptions of victor’s justice (Crisis Group, 2024). The empirical findings demonstrate that accountability-linked reforms were advanced purposefully—likely as part of a legitimacy-binding strategy by the interim government—but with less attention to insulating the judiciary from political influence. This suggests a trade-off typical of transitional settings: timely reforms for accountability may compete with institutional independence objectives.

6.4 Political-institutional dynamics and elite bargaining

Across all domains, a consistent theme is the role of elite bargaining and the political settlement environment in shaping reform trajectories. The data show that administrative reforms, being less threatening to power holders, moved forward with relative speed. Appointment and governance reforms, which would redistribute power away from entrenched actors, faced inertia. The prosecutorial reforms, while technically within the judiciary domain, were initiated by the executive as part of a broader political settlement that involved legitimacy creation and elite consolidation.

Media reports and NGO commentary repeatedly emphasised that senior judiciary leadership welcomed administrative modernisation but were more cautious about appointment changes that would diminish executive control. The interim government’s own public statements emphasised reform but also flagged that transitional justice and national security concerns remained priorities—giving the executive justification for prosecutorial expansion (The Guardian, 2024). Thus, the findings illustrate the elite-bargaining logic: reforms compatible with existing power distributions progressed; reforms requiring power redistribution stalled; and politically salient reforms were used instrumentally.

6.5 Summary of findings

To summarise, the case of Bangladesh’s interim government judiciary reform shows a sequenced reform trajectory: administrative modernisation first, governance reforms second (still pending), and accountability/prosecutorial reforms executed simultaneously but with different institutional logic. This trajectory is consistent with the theoretical framework: transitional junctures allow opportunity, but actor incentives and power structures mediate outcomes. The findings also suggest that while reform momentum exists, institutional embedding—especially in appointment/oversight domains—is weak at this stage. Long-term independence and rule-of-law gains will depend on how governance reforms are pursued beyond this initial period.

7. Discussion

The findings of this study reveal a nuanced progression of judicial reforms in Bangladesh during the interim period (August 2024–August 2025). The reform trajectory aligns in many respects with the combined analytical lens of historical institutionalism and elite-bargaining theory. This discussion addresses four key themes arising from the empirical analysis: the sequencing of reforms and path-dependency; the limits of independence in appointment and governance reforms; the accountability-independence trade-off in a transitional setting; and the prospects for institutional embedding and sustainability.

7.1 Sequencing of reforms, path dependence and “window of opportunity”

The empirical evidence suggests that the interim government and judiciary leadership deliberately pursued administrative modernisation—digital filings, case-flow management, backlog reduction—as the initial locus of reform. This stands in line with what historical institutionalism would predict: at a critical juncture (the interim period), actors focus on parts of the institutional architecture that are both manageable and less threatening to entrenched power centres, thereby exploiting a “window of opportunity” to initiate change (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000). Indeed, the fact that the judiciary itself issued a roadmap in September 2024 emphasising digital courts and administrative reforms reflects this strategic opening.

By prioritising these “low-risk” areas first, reformers generated early wins, built momentum, and created a basis for legitimacy and support both inside and outside the judiciary. It is notable that such modernisation enjoyed fewer veto players: transforming administrative processes requires fewer structural power shifts than overhauling appointment or disciplinary systems.

However, the concept of path-dependency remains relevant. The enduring legacy of executive dominance over the judiciary—through appointments, transfers, and administrative control—remained unaddressed in structural terms during this first phase. As historical institutionalists would argue, the earlier institutional settlement (executive-led appointment regime, administrative dependence) continues to shape reform possibilities: administrative modernisation may progress, but without addressing entrenched governance mechanisms, the reform will remain superficial.

The sequence observed—administration first, governance second, accountability concurrently—reflects a pragmatic strategy. Yet it also highlights that the institutional window is finite: the longer reforms remain confined to administrative improvements, the more entrenched older arrangements may reacclimate, reducing the likelihood of deeper change.

7.2 Limits of independence: Appointment, governance and elite bargaining

Alongside sequencing, the findings underscore how elite-bargaining dynamics shape the nature, depth, and content of reforms. Appointment and governance reforms emerged as the most politically contentious. The roadmap and reform commission recommendations called for a separate secretariat, a collegium-based appointments commission, transparent transfer rules, and tenure security. But during the period studied, structural reforms in these domains had not been fully enacted. The absence of statutory changes indicates that entrenched elites (executive, bureaucratic, political) retained effective veto power in the distribution of power over the judiciary.

Elite-bargaining theory helps to explain this. Reforming appointments and transfers effectively redistributes power away from the executive and the bureaucracy to the judiciary — a shift that disrupted vested interests. Unless those interests are either incentivised or constrained, reform in this domain is likely to stall. The interim government’s willingness to leave appointment reform less advanced suggests that compromises were reached: administrative and digital reforms proceeded while the more fundamental redistribution of power was deferred.

Moreover, the politics of legitimacy and accountability complicated this dynamic. The interim regime faced intense pressure for accountability — for the protest-era violence, for partisan excesses of the previous regime, and for ensuring that the judiciary appears responsive. As a result, governance reforms that might limit prosecutorial or executive influence were delayed, perhaps because the executive wished to retain discretion in transitional prosecutions. This interplay suggests a two-tier bargaining: administrative reforms proceeded relatively unimpeded; governance reforms required more consensus and were postponed.

7.3 Accountability and transitional justice: Trade-offs and risks

The third major theme pertains to accountability reforms — in this case, prosecutorial expansions, tribunal restructuring, and sweeping legal changes aimed at the previous regime’s “excesses”. The empirical findings show that the interim government amended legislation (e.g., the International Crimes Tribunal act), broadened prosecutorial powers, and banned political party activities — all under the banner of “justice for the past” (Today’s Financial Express, 2025). These steps are consistent with transitional justice logic: a new regime must demonstrate credibility and legitimacy by holding prior actors accountable (Teitel, 2003; Skaar, 2011).

However, such accountability reforms present significant risks for the judiciary’s institutional autonomy and legitimacy. The literature warns that when judicial reform is tied to transitional politics, the risk of instrumentality increases: courts may become mechanisms of victor’s justice rather than impartial arbiters (Skaar, 2011). In the Bangladesh case, while accountability measures may have reinforced the interim government’s legitimacy, they also appear to have been pursued without concurrent structural safeguards for independence (e.g., independent appointments, secure tenure). This may erode public trust in the judiciary’s impartiality over the longer term.

Furthermore, the accountability mechanism might undermine the sequencing logic: while administrative reforms progress, the simultaneous deployment of prosecutorial instruments may heighten political pressures on the judiciary and reduce its capacity to operate independently. The tension is clear: the interim government needed to show action, yet structural reform to protect independence lagged. This interplay highlights the transitional trade-off: legitimacy now versus institutional autonomy later.

7.4 Prospects for institutional embedding and sustainability

Finally, the analysis must address the question: will the reforms observed during this period endure? Sustainability requires more than pilot programmes and goodwill; it requires legal codification, institutional culture change, enforcement mechanisms, and actor buy-in (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2010). The findings suggest that some infrastructure for embedding is emerging — for example, the judiciary’s push for independent secretariat, the framing of helplines for public complaints, and training programmes. Yet the key features that ensure durability — independent appointments, tenure protection, and credible oversight mechanisms — remain only partially addressed.

The historical institutionalism perspective suggests that without altering the deeper structure of power over the judiciary, newly implemented administrative procedures may revert or be co-opted when the political moment shifts. The current reforms risk being superficial unless they become embedded into formal legal frameworks and actor practices.

Moreover, the interim context complicates embedding. Transitional governments often operate under compressed timetables, high expectations, and contested legitimacy (Teitel, 2003). The fact that the interim government of Bangladesh faces both broad reform demand and pressure for speedy accountability means that embedding mechanisms must be designed carefully. If reforms are rushed without broad consensus, they may lack legitimacy and may be reversed by subsequent governments (Nazrul, 2024).

On the positive side, the presence and active engagement of international partners (e.g., UNDP) and civil society dialogues suggest that momentum exists. The Barishal seminar of September 2025 reaffirmed commitments to independence and efficiency. Nevertheless, embedding is a medium- to long-term process; it requires the next phase of reform to address appointments and oversight decisively.

7.5 Synthesis and implications

Synthesising the discussion, we find that the reform trajectory in Bangladesh during the interim period is characterized by: early administrative modernisation, deferred governance reforms, concurrent accountability measures tied to the political transition, and emerging but incomplete embedding of institutional change. From a theoretical perspective, this sequencing is consistent with historical institutionalism’s emphasis on windows of opportunity and path-dependency; elite-bargaining theory explains why the more powerful domains of reform were delayed or constrained.

The implications are significant for both policy and scholarship. For policy: design of judicial reform in transitional periods must account for actor incentives, sequencing, and the legitimacy/independence trade-off. Reforms that ignore the governance domain may produce performance gains but fail to shift power dynamics underlying autonomy. For scholarship: the Bangladesh case illustrates a hybridity often underestimated in reform literature—modernisation and accountability agendas run in parallel, yet structural change stalls unless power redistribution is credible.

Lastly, the discussion underscores that a judiciary reform agenda during transition cannot treat each reform element in isolation. Administrative, appointment, oversight, and accountability reforms are interlocked. A piecemeal approach carries the risk of building new systems on old foundations, with limited autonomy, and thus recurrence of executive dominance. The interim government of Bangladesh has made meaningful strides—but the deeper challenge remains: converting reform momentum into institutional recalibration of power, culture, and norms.

8. Policy Recommendations

Grounded in the findings and guided by the theoretical framework, I outline policy recommendations aimed at steering reforms toward durable independence and justice:

• Sequence reforms strategically. Prioritise administrative modernisation and simultaneously prepare legal protections for appointment processes. Use pilot administrative successes to build consensus for codifying appointment safeguards.
• Establish a transparent appointments mechanism. Create a statute-based, multi-stakeholder Judicial Appointments Commission with clear criteria, public vetting processes, and representation for legal professionals and civil society to buffer political influence.
• Protect fair trial rights amid transitional prosecutions. Ensure that any prosecutorial expansions or tribunal amendments strictly conform to international fair trial standards, with independent monitors and accessible appellate remedies.
• Strengthen judicial administrative capacity. Invest in court IT systems, case-management training, and decentralised digital access points to reduce backlogs and improve transparency, while ensuring equitable geographic roll-out.
• Institutionalise accountability safeguards. Create independent judicial disciplinary bodies with transparent procedures and appeal rights to balance accountability and independence.
• Engage international technical partners selectively. Accept targeted technical assistance for digitalisation, case management, and judicial training while retaining domestic ownership and ensuring that assistance supports, not substitutes, local capacity.
• Promote inclusive consultations. Engage bar associations, civil society, and lower-court judges in reform design to enhance legitimacy and practical effectiveness.

These recommendations aim to balance the twin imperatives of accountability and procedural integrity during a politically fraught transition.

9. Conclusion

This article has examined the judicial reform agenda of Bangladesh’s interim government (August 2024–August 2025) through a combined lens of historical institutionalism and elite bargaining theory. The findings indicate that the reform strategy favoured administrative modernisation — digital filing, case-flow improvements and backlog reduction — as an early entry point, while governance reforms (appointments, tenure, disciplinary oversight) remained largely undeveloped. At the same time, accountability-oriented reforms linked to transitional justice were actively pursued. This pattern reflects the logic of a transitional window: around administrative reform there is less resistance; around power redistribution there is more bargaining; and around high-stakes accountability measures there is political urgency.

The implications of this analysis are twofold. On one hand, the administrative reform efforts represent a meaningful opening of the judiciary’s institutional space and may contribute to improved access, efficiency and public trust. On the other hand, the delay of governance reforms raises doubts about the depth of judicial independence achieved. Without structural change to appointments, transfers and oversight, the autonomy of the judiciary remains circumscribed and prone to revival of old patterns of executive influence.

Ultimately, sustainable judicial reform in transitional contexts such as Bangladesh depends not only on technical improvements but on how those improvements are embedded within the power structure, legal frameworks and organisational culture. The interim period offers a valuable “window”, but unless the deeper architecture of judicial governance is addressed, the gains risk being reversible. For Bangladesh, the next phase must focus on enshrining transparent appointment systems, securing tenure and building independent oversight. If it succeeds, the judiciary may emerge as a real arbiter rather than an instrument of the executive. If not, renewal may prove superficial.

In sum, the case of Bangladesh demonstrates the complex interplay of institutional opportunity, actor bargaining and reform sequencing. It confirms that meaningful judicial reform is neither linear nor purely technocratic: it is political, contested, and shaped by how stakeholders distribute power. The interim government has achieved a credible start; the challenge now is consolidation.

10. Limitations and Directions for Future Research

This study relied primarily on public documents, media reports, and NGO analyses available through August 2025. Future research should incorporate primary interviews with judicial officers, legislators, and interim government officials, as well as subnational court data to assess implementation impacts empirically. Comparative studies with other transitional contexts (e.g., Tunisia, Nepal) could illuminate pathways to institutional consolidation under political flux.

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